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Abstract
The pension rules link the amount of the future pension to the contributions during the working
period. So, in case the pension rules are not actuarial, they induce an implicit tax. In this paper,
we evaluate the implicit marginal tax resulting from the legislation on pensions in France. We
formulate the analytical expressions of this tax and estimate them as a benchmarking example
for a single man, born in 1952 with a full career.
1. INTRODUCTION
Contributions to Pay-As-You-Go pension schemes are included in the tax burden along VAT or
income tax. However, the computation rules of pensions rely on contributory principles (Devolder
(2005)) that tend to make the benefits received conditional on contributions paid. Hence, con-
sidering pension contributions as pure taxes is excessive. Following the study by Feldstein and
Samwick (1992) for the United States, we evaluate the fiscal nature of pension contributions for
France, by calculating the induced net marginal rate. Explicitly, it consists in using actuarial meth-
ods to measure the future amount of additional pension induced by each euro of additional wage.
First, we derive an analytical expression for the implicit marginal tax rate resulting from the
specific computation rules of pensions for private employees.
Second, we estimate the implicit marginal tax rate for a man, single, born in 1952 with a
complete career, who started working at 21 and retires now at 61.
2. ANALYTICAL EXPRESSIONS
We use actuarial methods, likely present value (LPV) and mortality tables, to estimate the tax
consequences of a marginal and instantaneous wage increase. The consequences are twofold:
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• In the short run, the contribution is the marginal cost.
At age x, this marginal cost τx can be obtained by taking the derivative of the LPV of payroll
taxes with respect to the current wage:
∆LPVx (payroll taxes)
∆wx
=
∆
∆wx
(
R−1
∑
y=x
qy,x
Ry,x
· τy · wy
)
= τx ,
where wx is the wage at age x, qy,x is the survival probability between age x and y (y ≥ x),
Ry,x is the factor of interest between age x and y (y ≥ x), and R denotes the age of the start
of the pension.
• In the long run, the gain is the increase of anticipated pensions.
At age x, this marginal gain can be obtained by taking the derivative of the LPV of pensions
with respect to the current wage:
∆LPVx (pensions)
∆wx
=
∆
∆wx
(
120
∑
y=R
qy,x
Ry,x
· py (W, Iy)
)
,
where py(W, Iy) is the pension rule with W a vector of the wages, and Iy is a vector of
institutional parameters prevailing at age y.
The French Pension System relies on two pillars.
1. The first pillar is a defined benefit paid by the CNAV (Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieil-
lesse). CNAV’s computation formula is given by Legros (2006), Bozio (2006):
pR (w, IR) = ρ (R, d, dpro., dcl.) ·


1
N
·
∑
wx∈Nbest years
λx,R ·min (wx, SSCx)

 , (1)
where
ρ (R, d, dpro., dcl.) = 0.5×min
(
1, d
dpro.
)
×
(
1− α1 ×max
(
0,min
(
(65−R)× 4, db/m − d
))
+α2 ×max
(
0,min
(
(R− 60)× 4, d− db/m
)))
.
Here, d is the number of quarters validated, “N best years” denotes the set of the N highest
discounted wages, SSCx is the ceiling basis for social security, λx,R is an updating coefficient of
past wages, dpro. and db/m are the durations used for pro rata computation and bonus/malus rates,
respectively, N = 25 years is the number of best wage-earning years set for the computation of the
average wage, α1 is a penalty (malus) discount factor and α2 is a reward (bonus) discount factor,
equal to 1.25% for each exceeding quarter from January 1st, 2009.
The marginal tax rate for a single worker (no reversion pension) can be obtained as
τmarg,x = τx − ρ (.) ·
qR,x
RR,x
·
1best years · 1wx<SSCx
1 + τ empx
·
λx,R
N
· äR , (2)
with τx = τ
SSC
x · 1wx<SSCx + τ
totwag
x , where τ
emp
x is the payroll tax rate paid by the employer
and τSSCx and τ
totwag
x are the contribution rates applying to the fraction of wage lying below the
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CNAV ceiling (SSCx) and the whole wage, with äR the value of 1 euro pension annuity perceived
from age R, indexed by legal factor I
p
y,R, and with ρ (.) the replacement rate. The expression also
contains two dummys: the dummy 1best years takes the value 1 if the wage belongs to the 25 “best
wage-earning years”, and the dummy 1wx<SSCx takes the value 1 if the wage lies below the ceiling.
2. The second pillar is a defined contribution —notional (point) accounts— paid by the ARRCO
and/or the AGIRC1. All workers of the private sector pay a contribution to ARRCO for the part
of their wage below the SSC. The blue collars (resp. white collars) pay a contribution to ARRCO
(resp. AGIRC) for the part of their wage beyond the SSC. The amount of pension depends on the
number of points accumulated at the date of the liquidation of the pension plan, see Legros (2006):
pR(W, IR) = ρ (.) ·
R−1
∑
y=D
τy · wy
v
buy
x
· vannx . (3)
with vbuyx the buying price of one point and v
ann
x the annuity value of one point. The coefficient ρ(.)
depends on the number of missing quarters compared either to the legal insurance period defined
by the CNAV or to the age for which the length of insurance is not taken into account. The marginal
tax rate can be written as
τmarg,x = τx ·
(
1− ρ(.) ·
qR,x
RR,x
·
vannR
v
buy
x
· äR
)
. (4)
3. COMPUTATION
The benchmark case is a single man born in 1952 with a complete career, who started working at
21 and retires now at 61. Notice that, obviously, no benefits accruing from the reversion pension
need to be considered here. People born in 1952 will retire when they are 60 years and 8 months.
People born in January 1952 will be allowed to retire from September 2012. Full pension will
require 41 years of activity. In our computations, we consider an occupational activity starting at
21 and going on without interruption for 41 years. Retirement age is then reached on the 62nd
birthday, which is on January 1st, 2014.
For our prospective analysis, we assume the contribution rates to be constant. To calculate
the future values of the points of the supplementary pension plans, we impose that the ratio buying
value / liquidation value keeps its trend value. The updating rate of wages and pensions is supposed
to be 2% (i.e. long term inflation rate). The discount rate is 4%. We use the TGH/TGF05 mortality
tables, which are the prescribed tables for annuities in France.
For wages that both lie below the CNAV ceiling (fraction A) and belong to the set of the 25 best
wage-earning years, the marginal rate induced by the basic pension regime follows an increasing
trajectory with age, from age 21 (−1.45%) to 28 (3.3%). As shown in Figure 1a, the marginal rate
is nil about age 38 and rapidly decreases afterwards to reach −17.2% at 61. For wages that lie
1Association pour le régime de retraite complémentaire des salariés (ARRCO), Association générale des institu-
tions de retraite des cadres (AGIRC).
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Figure 1: Marginal tax rate of pension contribution for each pillar, with the age on the horizontal
axis and the tax rate as a percentage on the vertical axis.
below the CNAV ceiling without belonging to the 25 best wage-earning years, the marginal rate is
exactly equal to the contribution rate. It keeps on increasing until age 39, reaching 11.8%, whereas
it is 6.3% at 21. The setting, in 1990, of a CNAV contribution rate on the overall gross wage has
a very moderate effect because the contribution rate for the fraction under the CNAV ceiling was
lowered. For the basic pension regime, the range of the marginal rate is wide, since the latter can
reach 11.8% for the wages of the “bad years” and drop as low as −17.2% for the wages of the “25
best years”. As to the wages that are above the CNAV ceiling, the marginal rate is zero until age
38. It is slightly above 1% at age 39 and reaches 1.2% about age 53.
Regarding the supplementary pension plan ARRCO (fraction A of wage), the profile of the
marginal rate is slightly modified (Figure 1b). The additional marginal rate is stable and positive
at the beginning of the career, where it fluctuates around 1.3% until age 31. This stability is due
to the increase of the contribution rate. Afterwards, the marginal rate decreases to stabilize again
around 0.1% from age 43 on. This new period of stability is a direct effect of the “repurchase
rate” on the contributions, which considerably reduces the purchasing power of points through the
contribution. From age 49 on, the marginal rate decreases to reach −1.8% at age 61.
To simplify the presentation of the results, the graph does not show the profile for AGIRC’s
fraction C (between 4 and 8 times the SSCx), because it is very similar to that of fraction B
(between SSCx and 4 times SSCx). Beyond the CNAV ceiling (fraction B of the supplementary
pension plans ARRCO and AGIRC), the contribution profiles are rather stable until age 31, because
of the historical increase of the ARRCO and AGIRC’s contribution rates. Afterwards, the marginal
rate decreases until 38. As for the ARRCO’s fraction A of the wage, the effect of the repurchase
rate applies and the marginal rate stabilizes around 1.5% for ARRCO and 2.6% for AGIRC. This
stabilization results in a decrease of the marginal rate with age such that it becomes negative after
age 49. The range of fluctuation is less than for the ARRCO’s fraction A: between −2% and 2%
for the AGIRC and between −2% and 1.5% for the ARRCO. The two plans progressively align
with the fraction B with time, which explains why the profiles of the marginal rates are very similar
from age 50 on.
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The computation rule applying to the supplementary pensions results in a narrower variation in-
terval for the marginal rates:[−1.8%, 1.5%] for ARRCO (fraction A), [−4.8%, 1.5%] for ARRCO
(fraction B), [−4.8%, 2.9%] for AGIRC (fraction B).
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Figure 2: Marginal tax rate of pension contribution - summary for each wage fraction, with the age
on the horizontal axis and the tax rate as a percentage on the vertical axis.
To summarize the implicit marginal rates for each fraction of wage, we must add all the
marginal rates (Figure 2): rates for the fractions of wage below and beyond the CNAV ceiling,
rates for the ARRCO’s and AGIRC’s fractions A and B. For fraction A (Figure 2a), the ranges are:
[−19%, 4.8%] for the 25 best wage-earning years and [7.1%, 12.6%] otherwise. For fraction B
(Figure 2b), the amplitudes are [−3.5%, 1.8%] for the ARRCO contributors and [−3.6%, 2.9%]
for the AGIRC contributors. A significant increase of all the rates of the B fraction occurs at age
39 due to the setting of a CNAV contribution rate (about 1%) applied to the overall wage without
any right to retirement attached to it.
4. CONCLUSION
Our computations show that pension contributions in France induce distortions, expressed by an
implicit marginal positive or negative taxation of labor, whose amplitude and profile depend on the
pension’s rules parameters and individual characteristics. Unsurprisingly, the implicit marginal tax
rate depends on the computation rules of pensions. The defined benefit system (CNAV) is affected
by a greater distortion than the defined contribution system (ARRCO and AGIRC), because the
former does not take into account all the wages in the computation of the pension.
Among many possible extensions, we suggest the following four:
1. Our sensitivity analysis would be more accurate if we could use other mortality tables than
the TGH/TGF05, which, being too prudential, underestimates future mortality rates.
2. Another way to assess the heterogeneity among individual careers is to rely on samples of
historical (Koubi (2002)) or prospective (dynamic microsimulation) career histories. The
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marginal tax rates could be evaluated according to age and generation, by means of a distri-
bution.
3. Our study focuses on single workers, which restricts the analysis, since the reversion pen-
sions are not taken into account.
4. It could be useful to estimate the likely present value of the costs and benefits induced by an
earlier or later retirement, see Hairault et al. (2005).
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